The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Insurability and Moral Hazard in Agricultural Insurance Markets
Abstract
Pareto‐optimal and constrained Pareto‐optimal all‐risk insurance contracts are studied. Conditions required for emergence of competitive insurance markets are isolated and discussed. Full insurance contracts are shown to be dominated by contracts involving coinsurance and deductibles if insurers are pseudo‐risk averse. The effect of moral hazard on all‐risk agricultural insurance indemnity schedules is examined. Results for indemnity schedules under moral hazard and constant absolute risk aversion show that providing farmers with the incentives to take appropriate actions may imply lower deductibles in the presence of moral hazard than in the absence of moral hazard.
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Citations
Cites
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003562 · Cited by 3,123
Cited by
Index Insurance for Developing Countries
Miranda, M. J., & Farrin, K. (2012) · Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy · doi:10.1093/aepp/pps031 · Cited by 310
Glauber, J. W. (2004) · American Journal of Agricultural Economics · doi:10.1111/j.0002-9092.2004.00663.x · Cited by 293
Metadata
- Authors
- Chambers, R. G.
- Venue
- American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1989-08
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 604-616
- ISSN
- 0002-9092 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8276
- OpenAlex
- W2077569034
- Cited by
- 244
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 3.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Insurability and Moral Hazard in Agricultural Insurance Markets. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/1242016
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- Chambers, R. G. (1989). Insurability and Moral Hazard in Agricultural Insurance Markets. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/1242016
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
