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The Secret Ambition of Deterrence
Abstract
In this Article, Professor Kahan identifies the political and moral economies of deterrence theory in legal discourse. Drawing on an extensive social science literature, he shows that deterrence arguments in fact have little impact on citizens' views on controversial policies such as capital punishment, gun control, and hate crime laws. Citizens conventionally defend their positions in deterrence terms only because the alternative is a highly contentious expressive idiom, which social norms, strategic calculation, and liberal morality all condemn. But not all citizens respond to these forces. Expressive zealots have an incentive to frame controversial issues in culturally partisan terms, thereby forcing moderate citizens to defect from the deterrence detente and declare their cultural allegiances as well. Accordingly deliberations permanently cycle between the disengaged, face-saving idiom of deterrence and the partisan, face-breaking idiom of expressive condemnation. These dynamics, Professor Kahan argues, complicate the normative assessment of deterrence. By abstracting from contentious expressive judgments, deterrence arguments serve the ends of liberal Public reason, which enjoins citizens to advance arguments accessible to individuals of diverse moral persuasions. But precisely because deterrence arguments denude the law of social meaning, the prominence of the deterrence idiom impedes progressives from harnessing the expressive power of the law to challenge unjust social norms. There is no stable discourse equilibrium between the deterrence and expressive idioms, either as a positive matter or a normative one.
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“By providing state-sponsored interpretations of historical events and the commemoration of crucial figures for the polity in question, memory laws embody the gist of deterrence: They seek to manage public discourse, delimiting what can and cannot be said ( Kahan 1999 , 146, 435).”
From Memory-Political Deterrence: Shielding Collective Memory and Ontological Security through Dissuasion (2023) · cites this paper as Kahan 1999
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Cited by
Party Over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on Political Beliefs.
Cohen, G. L. (2003) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.85.5.808 · Cited by 1,400
Why do People Comply with the Law?: Legitimacy and the Influence of Legal Institutions
Jackson, J., Bradford, B., Hough, M., Myhill, A., Quinton, P., & Tyler, T. R. (2012) · British Journal of Criminology · doi:10.1093/bjc/azs032 · Cited by 1,044
Memory-Political Deterrence: Shielding Collective Memory and Ontological Security through Dissuasion
Gustafsson, K., & Mälksoo, M. (2023) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqae006 · Cited by 21
Metadata
- Authors
- Kahan, D. M.
- Venue
- Harvard Law Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1999-12
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 413
- ISSN
- 0017-811X
- Cited by
- 50
- References
- 0
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