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Fairness versus Welfare
Abstract
The thesis of this Article is that the assessment of legal policies should depend exclusively on their effects on individuals'welfare. In particular, in the evaluation of legal policies, no independent weight should be accorded to conceptions of fairness, such as corrective justice and desert in punishment. (However, the logic leading to this conclusion does not apply to concern about equity in the distribution of income, which is often discussed under the rubric of fairness.)\nOur analysis begins with the argument that, when the choice of legal rules is based even in part on notions of fairness, individuals tend to be made worse off. Indeed, if any notion of fairness is ascribed evaluative weight, everyone will necessarily be made worse off in some situations. Moreover, when we examine principles of fairness and the literature that advances them, we find it difficult to identify reasons that, on reflection,\njustify granting importance to these principles at the expense of individuals' well-being. Nevertheless, policy analysts and the population at large obviously find notions of fairness appealing. We conjecture that the notions' attractiveness is rooted in several factors. Namely, individuals who believe in ideas of fairness tend to behave better toward others; the notions may serve as proxy goals for instrumental objectives; and individuals may have a taste for satisfaction of the notions. Furthermore, each of these factors is a reason that notions of fairness are relevant under a welfare-oriented normative approach to social decisionmaking. As we explain, however, none of these factors warrants treating notions of fairness as independent evaluative principles.\nWe develop our thesis through consideration of specific conceptions of fairness that are employed in major areas of the law: torts, contracts, legal procedure, and law enforcement. We also discuss the implications of our analysis for our primary audience, legal academics and other legal policy analysts, as well as for government officials, notably, legislators, regulators, and judges.
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Citations
Cited by
Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making
(2004) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9780470752937 · Cited by 961
The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice
Murphy, L., & Nagel, T. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0195150163.001.0001 · Cited by 768
A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications
HAUSER, M., CUSHMAN, F., YOUNG, L., KANG‐XING JIN, R., & MIKHAIL, J. (2007) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00297.x · Cited by 666
Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism
NUSSBAUM, M. C. (2011) · Philosophy & Public Affairs · doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2011.01200.x · Cited by 458
The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics
Kaplow, L. (2011) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400839223 · Cited by 344
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Kaplow, L., & Shavell, S.
- Venue
- Harvard Law Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2001-02
- Volume
- 114
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 961
- ISSN
- 0017-811X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1919878871
- Cited by
- 411
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 45.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Kaplow, L., & Shavell, S. (2001). Fairness versus Welfare. Harvard Law Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/1342642
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