Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness
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Abstract
Conscious experience presents a deep puzzle. On the one hand, a fairly robust materialism must be true in order to explain how it is that conscious events causally interact with non-conscious, physical events. On the other hand, we cannot explain how physical phenomena give rise to conscious experience. In this wide-ranging study, Joseph Levine explores both sides of the mind-body dilemma, presenting the first book-length treatment of his highly influential ideas on the explanatory the fact that we can't explain the nature of phenomenal experience in terms of its physical realization. He presents a careful argument that there is such a gap, and, after providing intriguing analyses of virtually all existing theories of consciousness, shows that recent attempts to close it fall short of the mark. Levine concludes that in the foreseeable future consciousness will remain a mystery.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Byrne, A., & Levine, J.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2002-10
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 594
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3161553380
- Cited by
- 266
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2024: 1 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 18 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 16 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 20 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 12.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Philosophical Review (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- consciousness, mind-body problem, phenomenal experience, materialism, physicalism, explanatory gap, theory of consciousness, causal interaction
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