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The Information Available in Pictures
Abstract
The author reviews two current conflicting theories of what a picture is: (1) that it consists of a sheaf of light rays coming to a station point or perceiver, each corresponding to a spot of color on the picture surface and hence that the picture can stand for a real object or scene insofar as the rays from the picture are the same as the rays from the real object; (2) that it consists of a set of symbols, more or less like words, and the perceiver must learn to ‘read’ it. According to the first theory, a child can perceive an object in a picture as soon as it can perceive a real object; according to the second one, the child must learn to ‘read’ the picture much as it learns to read written speech. He points out the fallacies of both theories, shows that they cannot be combined and suggests a new theory based on the radical assumption that light can convey information about the world and, hence, that the phenomenal world does not have to be constructed by the mind (or the brain) out of meaningless data. This theory makes it possible to distinguish between the pictorially mediated perception of the features of a world and the direct perception of the features of the surroundings and yet to understand that there is common information for the features they have in common. His theory accounts for the difference between verbal and visual thinking. Visual thinking is freer and less stereotyped than verbal thinking; there is no vocabulary of picturing as there is of saying. As every artist knows, there are thoughts that can be visualized without being verbalized. L’auteur passe en revue deux théories courantes et opposées sur la nature de l’image: (1) l’image est formée d’un faisceau de rayons lumineux convergeant vers un point précis: le spectateur; chaque rayon correspond à une tache de couleur sur la surface de l’image et par conséquent celle-ci peut ètre considérée comme un objet réel ou une scène dans la mesure où les rayons provenant de l’image sont semblables aux rayons provenant de l’objet réel; (2) l’image est formée par un ensemble de symboles qui sont à peu près comme les mots et le spectateur doit apprendre à la ‘lire’. Selon la première théorie, un enfant peut percevoir un objet dans une image dès qu’il peut percevoir l’objet réel; selon la seconde, l’enfant doit apprendre à ‘lire’ l’image de la même façon qu’il doit apprendre à lire le discours écrit. Il met en évidence ce qu’il y a de faux dans ces deux théories, montre qu’elles ne peuvent se combiner et suggère une nouvelle théorie basée sur l’hypothèse hardie que la lumière peut véhiculer de l’information et que par conséquent l’esprit (ou le cerveau) n’a pas besoin de construire le monde des apparences à partir de données dépourvues de signification. Cette théorie rend possible la distinction entre la perception du monde médiatisée par l’image et la perception directe de ce qui nous entoure tout en nous permettant de comprendre qu’une information semblable rende compte de leurs particularités communes. Cette théorie précise la différence entre la pensée verbale et la pensée en images. La pensée en images est plus libre et moins stéréotypée que la pensée verbale; il n’y a pas de vocabulaire de l’image comme il y a un vocabulaire de la parole. Les artistes savent bien qu’il y a des pensées qu’on peut imaginer sans les formuler.
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Citations
Cited by
Characteristics of dissociable human learning systems
Shanks, D. R., & St. John, M. F. (1994) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00035032 · Cited by 1,163
Early understanding of the representational function of pictures
DeLoache, J. S., & Burns, N. M. (1994) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(94)90063-9 · Cited by 290
Grasping the Nature of Pictures
DeLoache, J. S., Pierroutsakos, S. L., Uttal, D. H., Rosengren, K. S., & Gottlieb, A. (1998) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00039 · Cited by 281
Metadata
- Authors
- Gibson, J. J.
- Venue
- Leonardo
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1971
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 27
- ISSN
- 0024-094X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4230671393
- Cited by
- 298
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 0.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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