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Information Overload in a Network of Targeted Communication
Open accessAbstract
As the costs of generating and transmitting information fall, the main bottlenecks in communication networks are becoming the human receivers, who are overloaded with information. For networks of targeted communication, this paper discusses the meaning of information overload, provides a theoretical treatment of its causes, and examines mechanisms for allocating the attention of receivers. Mechanisms for allocating atten-tion include surcharges on communication and auctions. These mechanisms increase the cost of sending messages and shift the task of screening messages from the receivers to the senders. This shift may benefit both the receivers and the senders because the senders know the contents of the messages whereas the receivers do not. We show that, if the communication cost is low, then an increase in the communication cost benefits most (but not all) receivers. The increase benefits all the senders if either the extra cost is a tax that is redistributed to them as lump-sum transfers or the senders’ information about the receivers is sufficiently accurate. Author’s address:
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Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Information Load and Consumer Decision Making
Malhotra, N. K. (1982) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/208882 · Cited by 778
Cited by
Acquisti, A., Taylor, C., & Wagman, L. (2016) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.54.2.442 · Cited by 1,283
When More Alternatives Lead to Less Choice
Kuksov, D., & Villas-Boas, J. M. (2010) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.1090.0535 · Cited by 286
Targeted advertising and advertising avoidance
Johnson, J. P. (2013) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12014 · Cited by 272
Targeting in advertising markets: implications for offline versus online media
Bergemann, D., & Bonatti, A. (2011) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2011.00143.x · Cited by 258
The personalization–privacy paradox in the attention economy
Cloarec, J. (2020) · Technological Forecasting and Social Change · doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2020.120299 · Cited by 112
Metadata
- Authors
- Zandt, T. V.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2004
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 542
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2112123110
- Cited by
- 167
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 11.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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