The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Jurisprudence and Gender
Open accessAbstract
What is a human being? Legal theorists must, perforce, answer this question: jurisprudence, after all, is about human beings. The task has not proven to be divisive. In fact, virtually all modern American legal theorists, like most modern moral and political philosophers, either explicitly or implicitly embrace what I will call the “separation thesis” about what it means to be a human being: a “human being,” whatever else he is, is physically separate from all other human beings. I am one human being and you are another, and that distinction between you and me is central to the meaning of the phrase “human being.” Individuals are, in the words of one commentator, “distinct and not essentially connected with one another.” 1 We are each physically “boundaried”— this is the trivially true meaning of the claim that we are all individuals. In Robert Nozick’s telling phrase, the “root idea” of any acceptable moral or political philosophy is that “there are individuals with separate lives.” 2 Although Nozick goes on to derive from this insight an argument for the minimal state, the separation thesis is hardly confined to the libertarian right. According to Roberto Unger, premiere spokesperson for the communitarian left, “[t]o be conscious is to have the experience of being cut off from that about which one reflects: it is to be a subject that stands over against its objects . … The subjective awareness of separation … defines consciousness ” 3 The political philosopher Michael Sandel has recently argued that most (not all) modern political theory is committed to the proposition that “[w]hat separates us is in some important sense prior to what connects us—epistemologically prior as well as morally prior. We are distinct individuals first, and then we form relationships and engage in co-operative arrangements with others; hence the priority of plurality over unity.” 4 The same commitment underlies virtually all of our legal theory. Indeed, Sandel’s formulation may be taken as a definitive restatement of the “separation thesis” that underlies modern jurisprudence.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global
Held, V. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0195180992.001.0001 · Cited by 615
Tavris, C. (1993) · Feminism & Psychology · doi:10.1177/0959353593032002 · Cited by 307
Regulating AI in Mental Health: Ethics of Care Perspective
Tavory, T. (2024) · JMIR Mental Health · doi:10.2196/58493 · Cited by 108
Metadata
- Authors
- West, R.
- Venue
- The University of Chicago Law Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1988
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1
- ISSN
- 0041-9494 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1526888921
- Cited by
- 334
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 11.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Jurisprudence and Gender. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/1599769
- The paper
- West, R. (1988). Jurisprudence and Gender. The University of Chicago Law Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/1599769
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.