The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Discrimination, Nepotism, and Long-Run Wage Differentials
Abstract
The wage discrimination model developed by Becker has been criticized for predicting that competitive forces will lead to the disappearance of racial discrimination in the long run. We have reformulated the model in terms of nepotism toward white workers rather than discrimination against black workers. In this new framework, both nepotistic and taste-neutral firms are expected to survive the competitive struggle in the long run. Therefore, the new framework is consistent with long-run as well as short-run racial wage differentials.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Inside the Family Firm: The Role of Families in Succession Decisions and Performance
Bennedsen, M., Nielsen, K., Pérez-González, F., & Wolfenzon, D. (2006) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w12356 · Cited by 783
Experimental research on labor market discrimination
Neumark, D. (2018) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20161309 · Cited by 529
Competition, Small Business Financing, and Discrimination: Evidence from a New Survey
Cavalluzzo, K. S., Cavalluzzo, L. C., & Wolken, J. D. (2002) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/341638 · Cited by 487
Importing Equality? The Impact of Globalization on Gender Discrimination
Black, S. E., & Brainerd, E. (2004) · ILR Review · doi:10.1177/001979390405700404 · Cited by 448
Prejudice and Wages: An Empirical Assessment of Becker’s The Economics of Discrimination
Charles, K. K., & Guryan, J. (2008) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/593073 · Cited by 419
Metadata
- Authors
- Goldberg, M. S.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1982-05
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 307
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1977435027
- Cited by
- 224
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 9.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Discrimination, Nepotism, and Long-Run Wage Differentials. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/1880760
- The paper
- Goldberg, M. S. (1982). Discrimination, Nepotism, and Long-Run Wage Differentials. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/1880760
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.