The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Signaling in Credit Markets
Abstract
In this paper we show that, under a variety of alternative assumptions about the private information of loan applicants, a competitive market for loans is characterized by screening. Banks separate out loan risks by offering higher loans at higher interest rates. Depending on the nature of the informational asymmetry, it may be that applicants with less risky projects select larger rather than smaller loans. Comparative statics implications are also examined. In particular, we explore the effects of an increase in banks' cost of funds on average loan quality.
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Citations
Cites
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769
Asymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in Loan Agreements
Chan, Y.-S., & Kanatas, G. (1985) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/1992508 · Cited by 473
Cited by
On the Financing Benefits of Supply Chain Transparency and Blockchain Adoption
Chod, J., Trichakis, N., Tsoukalas, G., Aspegren, H., & Weber, M. (2020) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2019.3434 · Cited by 654
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN CREDIT MARKETS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MACRO-ECONOMICS
STIGLITZ, J. E., & WEISS, A. (1992) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a042071 · Cited by 381
Strategic Information Transmission in Peer-to-Peer Lending Markets
Caldieraro, F., Zhang, J. Z., Cunha, M., & Shulman, J. D. (2018) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1509/jm.16.0113 · Cited by 101
Metadata
- Authors
- Milde, H., & Riley, J. G.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1988-02
- Volume
- 103
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 101
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2049311250
- Cited by
- 169
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 4.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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