The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
Abstract
In many examples of competitive bidding (e.g., government construction contracting) the relevant object is either partially divisible or ill-defined, in contrast to much of the recent theoretical work on auctions. In this paper we consider a more general class of auctions, in which bidders name a “menu” of offers for various possible actions (allocations) available to the auctioneer. We focus upon “first-price” menu auctions under the assumption of complete information, and show that, for an attractive refinement of the set of Nash Equilibria, an efficient action always results. Our model also has application to situations of economic influence, in which interested parties independently attempt to influence a decision-maker's action.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Putting Auction Theory to Work
Milgrom, P. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511813825 · Cited by 1,642
Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation
Goldberg, P. K., & Maggi, G. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.5.1135 · Cited by 854
Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation
Bombardini, M. (2008) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2008.03.003 · Cited by 310
Corruption and energy efficiency in OECD countries: theory and evidence
Fredriksson, P. G., Vollebergh, H. R. J., & Dijkgraaf, E. (2004) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2003.08.001 · Cited by 310
To Segregate or to Integrate: Education Politics and Democracy
DE LA CROIX, D., & DOEPKE, M. (2009) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00529.x · Cited by 135
Metadata
- Authors
- Bernheim, B. D., & Whinston, M. D.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1986-02
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1969028417
- Cited by
- 1,223
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 2.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/1884639
- The paper
- Bernheim, B. D., & Whinston, M. D. (1986). Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884639
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
