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Competitive Equilibrium Under Uncertainty
Abstract
The paper represents an application of the modern theory of competitive equilibrium to the case of uncertainty. Two theorems are presented: the first sets forth sufficient conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium for the case in which each economic agent has a given structure of information available and the second sets forth sufficient conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium for the case in which any available structure of information may be used. However, if the costs of obtaining information are included in the analysis, the conditions of the theorem may not be met. This is also true if the costs necessary to perform computations are included. In addition if part of the information available to economic agents concerns the behavior of other agents rather than concerning environmental variables, the conditions of the theorem may not be fulfilled. (Author)
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“Indeed, economic theory posits that where market actors fail to disclose essential information, the resulting asymmetries cause market failure (Radner, 1968).”
From Consumers Beware: Online Personalized Pricing in Action! How the Framing of a Mandated Discriminatory Pricing Disclosure Influences Intention to Purchase (2020) · cites this paper as Radner, 1968
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Cited by
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics
Stiglitz, J. E. (2000) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555015 · Cited by 1,469
Dosi, G., & Egidi, M. (1991) · Journal of Evolutionary Economics · doi:10.1007/bf01224917 · Cited by 342
Operations management and the resource based view: Another view
Bromiley, P., & Rau, D. (2016) · Journal of Operations Management · doi:10.1016/j.jom.2015.11.003 · Cited by 325
Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action
Runge, C. F. (1984) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2130438 · Cited by 290
Metadata
- Authors
- Radner, R.
- Corresponding author
- Radner, Roy
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1968-01
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 31
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4249403668
- Cited by
- 455
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 28 · 2018: 22 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 10 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 10
- FWCI
- 29.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Econometrica (publishedVersion)
- Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic theories and models
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Keywords
- competitive equilibrium, uncertainty, existence of equilibrium, information structure, information costs, computational cost, sufficient conditions
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.