The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Potential, Value, and Consistency
Abstract
Let P be a real-valued function defined on the space of cooperative games with transferable utility, satisfying the following condition: In every game, the marginal contributions of all players (according to P) are efficient (i.e., add up to the worth of the grand coalition). It is proved that there exists just one such function P--called the potential--and moreover that the resulting payoff vector coincides with the Shapley value. The potential approach yields other characterizations for the value; in particular, in terms of a new internal consistency property. Further results deal with weighted values and with the nontransferable utility case. Copyright 1989 by The Econometric Society.
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Cites
Aumann, R. J., & Shapley, L. S. (2015) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400867080 · Cited by 742
Conference structures and fair allocation rules
Myerson, R. B. (1980) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01781371 · Cited by 611
A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
Harsanyi, J. C. (1982) · Papers in Game Theory · doi:10.1007/978-94-017-2527-9_3 · Cited by 315
Stability and the Nash solution
Lensberg, T. (1988) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(88)90273-6 · Cited by 127
A Reformulation of the Marginal Productivity Theory of Distribution
Ostroy, J. M. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913467 · Cited by 48
Monotonicity, stability and egalitarianism
THOMSON, W. J. (1984) · Mathematical Social Sciences · doi:10.1016/0165-4896(84)90058-1 · Cited by 22
Cited by
Shapley values for feature selection: the good, the bad, and the axioms
Fryer, D., Strumke, I., & Nguyen, H. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3119110 · Cited by 347
Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory
Chalkiadakis, G., Elkind, E., & Wooldridge, M. (2012) · Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-01558-8 · Cited by 337
Winter, E. (2002) · Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications · doi:10.1016/s1574-0005(02)03016-3 · Cited by 337
The Measurement of Intellectual Influence
Palacios-Huerta, I., & Volij, O. (2004) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00519.x · Cited by 328
Metadata
- Authors
- Hart, S., & Mas-Colell, A.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1989-05
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 589
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2113726644
- Cited by
- 728
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 31.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.