The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
Abstract
This paper provides two results that are useful in proving the exist ence of and characterizing separating equilibria in signaling games. A key element in the analysis of separating equilibria is the examina tion of the implied incentive compatibility constraints. It is shown that these constraints imply differentiability of strategies. In addi tion, a monotonicity condition (which is similar to the single crossi ng condition) is analyzed that is necessary and sufficient for there to be a strategy satisfying the incentive compatibility constraints. As a direct consequence of these two results, the analysis of Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1982) is considerably strengthened. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.
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The assumptions made in Mailath's (1987) rigorous existence proof apply to the confidence model with one exception: the marginal cost of the signal evaluates to zero at the lower bound, whereas Mailath assumes Cb > 0 if b = a.
“The assumptions made in Mailath ' s (1987) rigorous existence proof apply to the con fi dence model with one exception. The marginal cost of the signal evaluates to zero at the lower bound ( Cb = 0 if b = a ), whereas Mailath assumes Cb > 0 if b = a .”
From Talking the talk, not walking the walk: The coevolution of overconfidence and loss aversion (2026) · cites this paper as Mailath ' s (1987)
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Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects
(2009) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta7384 · Cited by 1,081
Talking the talk, not walking the walk: The coevolution of overconfidence and loss aversion
Dawson, C., & de Meza, D. (2026) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000644 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Mailath, G. J.
- Corresponding author
- Mailath, George J.
- ORCID
- Mailath, George J.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1987-11
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1349
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2014508721
- Cited by
- 260
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 12 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 2.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Econometrica (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Keywords
- signaling games, separating equilibrium, incentive compatibility constraints, monotonicity constraints, single-crossing condition, existence of equilibrium
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