Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
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Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The step from direct to indirect reciprocity corresponds to the step from personal enforcement to community enforcement.
“In this sense, the step from direct to indirect reciprocity corresponds simply to the step from personal enforcement to community enforcement 26-29 .”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [27]
Game theory shows that even if information is transmitted only locally and errors occur occasionally, cooperation can be sustained: there exist strategies such that no rational player has an interest to deviate unilaterally.
“Game theory shows that even if information is transmitted only locally and errors occur occasionally, cooperation can be sustained: there exist strategies such that no rational player has an interest to deviate unilaterally 27 .”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [27]
No player has an incentive to deviate if all other players adopt the label strategy, and the effect of an error will be overcome after T rounds.
“No player has an incentive to deviate if all other players adopt this strategy, and the effect of an error will be overcome after T rounds.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [27]
Game theory shows that cooperation can be sustained in the indirect reciprocity game if each player carries a label.
“Game theory shows that cooperation can be sustained in the indirect reciprocity game if each player carries a label 27 .”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [27]
The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet
Cited by 79
- Authors
- Rosenthal, R. W.
- Corresponding author
- Rosenthal, R. W.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1979-11
- Volume
- 47
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1353
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4246086235
- Cited by
- 79
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 4 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 3.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Econometrica (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Sports Analytics and Performance
- Keywords
- repeated games
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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