Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
CoChat

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric Analysis

Wright, Gavin · 1974 · The Review of Economics and Statistics

Abstract

T HE New Deal years offer a laboratory for testing the hypothesis that political behavior a democracy can be understood as a rational effort to maximize the prospects of electoral success. This hypothesis is central to the theories of politics developed and elaborated since the publication of Downs' An Economic Theory of Democracy 1957, but systematic empirical verification has been meager.' One of the reasons for this paucity is that the United States political parties are rarely in power unambiguously, and actual policies result from the interaction of many competing objectives. But the 1930's the Democratic party had control of both houses of Congress, and during much of the period Congress was willing to follow Presidential lead on economic policy. At the same time federal spending rose to unprecedented levels, and considerable discretionary allocative authority was concentrated the executive branch. Most of the spending was carried out by new agencies under new programs which were clearly identified with the New Deal administration. At a time of grave economic distress, this Presidentially-dominated environment provided a stark simplification of the interaction between political and economic forces. This article focuses on the allocation of government expenditures among the states and argues that interstate inequalities per capita federal spending can be explained large part as the resultant of a process of maximizing expected electoral votes. Two recent articles (1969, 1970) by Leonard J. Arrington have raised this issue. Upon examination of a newlydiscovered set of figures for the years 19331939, Arrington was struck by the fact that the per capita distribution of loans and expenditures was not at all equal across the country, and furthermore that these inequalities seem perverse that they favor states with high income. In particular, the West seems to have received far more than its per capita share of benefits, while the South -far behind income received little.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2307/1927524

Cites

15 of 15 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Citations

Cites

Show all 15 references

Cited by

See all 446

Metadata

Authors
Wright, G.
Corresponding author
Wright, Gavin
Venue
The Review of Economics and Statistics
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1974-02
Volume
56
Issue
1
Pages
30
ISSN
0034-6535 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2022718562
Cited by
406
References
15
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 16 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 17 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 22
FWCI
9.17
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The Review of Economics and Statistics (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Politics, Economics, and Education Policy
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
Keywords
New Deal, federal spending, regional disparities, Democratic Party, 1930s United States

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric Analysis. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/1927524
The paper
Wright, G. (1974). The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric Analysis. The Review of Economics and Statistics. https://doi.org/10.2307/1927524

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.