The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric Analysis
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
T HE New Deal years offer a laboratory for testing the hypothesis that political behavior a democracy can be understood as a rational effort to maximize the prospects of electoral success. This hypothesis is central to the theories of politics developed and elaborated since the publication of Downs' An Economic Theory of Democracy 1957, but systematic empirical verification has been meager.' One of the reasons for this paucity is that the United States political parties are rarely in power unambiguously, and actual policies result from the interaction of many competing objectives. But the 1930's the Democratic party had control of both houses of Congress, and during much of the period Congress was willing to follow Presidential lead on economic policy. At the same time federal spending rose to unprecedented levels, and considerable discretionary allocative authority was concentrated the executive branch. Most of the spending was carried out by new agencies under new programs which were clearly identified with the New Deal administration. At a time of grave economic distress, this Presidentially-dominated environment provided a stark simplification of the interaction between political and economic forces. This article focuses on the allocation of government expenditures among the states and argues that interstate inequalities per capita federal spending can be explained large part as the resultant of a process of maximizing expected electoral votes. Two recent articles (1969, 1970) by Leonard J. Arrington have raised this issue. Upon examination of a newlydiscovered set of figures for the years 19331939, Arrington was struck by the fact that the per capita distribution of loans and expenditures was not at all equal across the country, and furthermore that these inequalities seem perverse that they favor states with high income. In particular, the West seems to have received far more than its per capita share of benefits, while the South -far behind income received little.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Moreover the prediction market odds were comparable to those from 1936, when there was evidence of Roosevelt allocating New Deal spending at least in part to increase his electoral chances (Wright (1974)).”
From The arsenal of democracy: Production and politics during WWII (2018) · cites this paper as Wright (1974)
Citations
Cites
A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System
Shapley, L. S., & Shubik, M. (1954) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1951053 · Cited by 2,162
The Theory of Political Coalitions
Brazil, B. R., & Riker, W. S. (1963) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/445870 · Cited by 2,106
An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process
Davis, O. A., Hinich, M. J., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1970) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1953842 · Cited by 744
The Effects of Precinct-Level Canvassing on Voter Behavior
Kramer, G. H. (1970) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1086/267841 · Cited by 167
The Future of American Politics, by Samuel Lubell
Graff, H. F. (1952) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2145155 · Cited by 130
The WPA and Federal Relief Policy.
Winston, E., & Howard, D. S. (1944) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2086043 · Cited by 105
Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal
Tull, C. J., & Patterson, J. T. (1968) · The History Teacher · doi:10.2307/3054246 · Cited by 77
America's Greatest Depression, 1929-1941.
Green, G. A., & Chandler, L. V. (1971) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2325767 · Cited by 66
Voting behavior and aggregate policy targets
Lepper, S. J. (1974) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf01718497 · Cited by 55
The New Deal in the West: A Preliminary Statistical Inquiry
Arrington, L. (1969) · Pacific Historical Review · doi:10.2307/3636102 · Cited by 45
Cited by
Items 401–446 of 446
Barberia, L., & Avelino, G. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal
Do Small States Get More Federal Monies? The Myth of Overrepresentation in the US Senate
Larcinese, V., Rizzo, L., & Testa, C. (2006)
Idema, T. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal
The Effect of Business Cycles on Voters' BehaviorPreprint
Rezaeedaryakenari, S. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2289979
Luca, D. (2015) · London School of Economics and Political Science Theses Online (London School of Economics and Political Science)
THE NEW DEAI: THE COLLAPSE OF THE LIBERAI CONSENSUS
Bemstein, I., Mifflin, H., & Biles, R. (1987)
Bozçağa, T. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2801727
Polling and Patronage for Roosevelt and the New Deal
Holli, M. G. (2002) · Palgrave Macmillan US eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-137-09547-3_4
Seat-vote elasticity and the provincial distribution of government spending in Turkey
Uslu, Ç. L. (2016) · Eurasian economic review : · doi:10.1007/s40822-016-0056-7
Essays On The Economics Of Labor Market Institutions And Political Economy
Soundararajan, V. (2016) · eCommons (Cornell University) · doi:10.7298/x47m05wc
Brain power: the political economy of higher education
Idema, T. (2011) · Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) · doi:10.5287/ora-xvmxd1qo9
Three Essays in American Politics
Menchaca, M. A. (2017) · eScholarship (California Digital Library)
The social democratic model and the American states : a study in welfare state geography /
Low, M. (1993) · OhioLink ETD Center (Ohio Library and Information Network)
The Dust Bowl and American elections
Alam, M. I. (2018) · UVic’s Research and Learning Repository (University of Victoria)
On Government Effectiveness: Organizational and Governance Limitations on the Delivery of Education
Moreira, D. (2017) · Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University)
Андреевич, В. И. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3670508
Fishback, P. (2016) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
Do Party Ties Increase Transfer Receipts in Cooperative Federalism? – Evidence from GermanyPreprint
Bury, Y., Feld, L. P., & Köhler, E. A. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4628543
Migration Creation, Diversion, and Retention: New Deal Grants and Migration: 1935-1940Preprint
Sørensen, T., Fishback, P., Allen, S. K., & Kantor, S. (2007) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
What Was New About the New DealPreprint
Fishback, P., & WALLIS, J. J. (2012) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
A Swing-State Theorem, with EvidencePreprint
Ma, X., McLaren, J., & Chalak, K. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4837640
Essays on political economy and development
Keene, J.-L. (2020) · theses.fr (ABES) · doi:10.70675/b58cb77bzb71dz4edaz9745z7a2594c00051
Transferências voluntárias da União para os Municípios: barganha política ou políticas públicas?
Marques, F. G. (2019) · Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations (Universidade de São Paulo) · doi:10.11606/t.8.2019.tde-30122021-183208
(1979) · Policy Studies Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.1979.tb01355.x
(2016) · Emerald Group Publishing Limited eBooks · doi:10.1108/978-1-78635-158-620161016
Do Pivotal Politicians Benefit Constituent Companies?Preprint
Raina, S., & Xu, S.-J. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4079133
The Political Economy of Lighthouses in Antebellum AmericaPreprint
Callais, J. T., & Geloso, V. J. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4017175
Fishback, P. (2008) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2554-1
(2001) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.4337/9781843763017.00045
Political Allocation of Agriculture Disaster Payments in the 1990s
Garrett, T. A., Marsh, T. L., & Marshall, M. I. (2003) · doi:10.20955/wp.2003.005
ELECTORAL IMPACTS OF IMPROVING PRIMARY HEALTH CARE
BRAGA, L. L. K. R. (2020) · doi:10.17771/pucrio.acad.50655
Escravidão, raça e coronelismo: municípios e finanças públicas em São Paulo da Primeira República
Nóbrega, J. L. (2023) · Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations (Universidade de São Paulo) · doi:10.11606/t.8.2023.tde-17052023-143938
Joanis, M., & Stringer, T. (2024) · The American Review of Canadian Studies · doi:10.1080/02722011.2024.2390327
Jou, A., & Morgan, T. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5188516
Younda, D. U., & Tcheunta, J. N. (2025) · Defence and Peace Economics · doi:10.1080/10242694.2025.2556353
Fishback, P. (2008) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-58802-2_1178
The political economy of intergovernmental grants: evidence from Portugal
Veiga, L. G., & Pinho, M. M. (2006) · Portuguese National Funding Agency for Science, Research and Technology (RCAAP Project by FCT)
Essays in Environmental Economics: Exploring the Effects of Extreme Events
Wang, V. L. (2025) · eScholarship (California Digital Library)
Who gets the schools? : Political targeting of economic and social infrastructure provisionin Zambia
Leiderer, S. (2014) · Fachinformationen für Politikwissenschaft, Verwaltungswissenschaft und Kommunalwissenschaften (Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik)
Do politicians gratify core supporters? Evidence from a discretionary grant programPreprint
Kauder, B., Björn, K., Niklas, P., & Markus, R. (2016) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
Yritystuet ja poliittinen päätöksenteko
Toni, R., Joonas, R., & Janne, T. (2023) · UTUPub (University of Turku)
Tax Breaks for Swing States? Political Bargaining, Targeted Policies, and Firm Outcomes
Raina, S., & Xu, S.-J. (2026) · The Review of Corporate Finance Studies · doi:10.1093/rcfs/cfag013
Distributional patterns and comparative insights from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act
Zhang, K., Shaheen, Q. H., Halimi, Z., & Cui, Q. (2026) · Transport Policy · doi:10.1016/j.tranpol.2026.104424
Abidar, B., Houssame, B., & Ettor, R. (2023) · International Journal of Accounting, Finance, Auditing, Management and Economics
Metadata
- Authors
- Wright, G.
- Corresponding author
- Wright, Gavin
- ORCID
- Wright, Gavin
- Venue
- The Review of Economics and Statistics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1974-02
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 30
- ISSN
- 0034-6535 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2022718562
- Cited by
- 406
- References
- 15
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 16 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 17 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 22
- FWCI
- 9.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Review of Economics and Statistics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Politics, Economics, and Education Policy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Keywords
- New Deal, federal spending, regional disparities, Democratic Party, 1930s United States
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.