The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process
Abstract
The fundamental process of politics is the aggregation of citizens' preferences into a collective—a social—choice. We develop, interpret, and explain non-technically in this expository essay the definitions, assumptions, and theorems of a mathematical model of one aggregative mechanism—the electoral process. This mechanism is conceptualized here as a multidimensional model of spatial competition in which competition consists of candidates affecting turnout and the electorate's perception of each candidate's positions, and in which the social choice is a policy package which the victorious candidate advocates. This approach, inaugurated by Downs's An Economic Theory of Democracy, and falling under the general rubric “spatial models of party competition,” has been scrutinized, criticized, and reformulated. To clarify the accomplishments of this formulation we identify and discuss in section 2 the general democratic problem of ascertaining a social preference. We review critically in section 3 the definitions and assumptions of our model. We consider in sections 4 and 5 the logic of a competitive electoral equilibrium. We assume in section 4 that the electorate's preferences can be summarized and represented by a single function; the analysis in section 5 pertains to competition between two organizational structures or two opposed ideologies (i.e., when two functions are required to summarize and represent the electorate's preference). Finally, we suggest in section 6 a conceptualization of electoral processes which facilitates extending and empirically testing our model.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens
Gilens, M., & Page, B. I. (2014) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592714001595 · Cited by 2,700
Effects of Public Opinion on Policy
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Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition
Lindbeck, A., & Weibull, J. W. (1987) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00116710 · Cited by 1,611
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
Shepsle, K. A. (1979) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110770 · Cited by 1,483
A Directional Theory of Issue Voting
Rabinowitz, G., & Macdonald, S. E. (1989) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956436 · Cited by 1,293
Metadata
- Authors
- Davis, O. A., Hinich, M. J., & Ordeshook, P. C.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1970-06
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 426-448
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2313814871
- Cited by
- 744
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 83.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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