The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories
Abstract
A formal model of electoral behavior is developed under the assumption that candidates have policy preferences as well as an interest in winning per se. This model is shown to have an equilibrium in a k-issue space when there are two candidates. The implications of this model are compared to the implications of the Downsian-type model where candidates are interested only in winning. Testable propositions are derived via the use of comparative statics. The results of recent studies are shown to coincide with the synthesis model but not the pure Downsian model. The theoretical model bridges the gap between formal theory and empirical research and unifies a variety of seemingly unrelated studies.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Banfield, E. C., & Downs, A. (1958) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109186 · Cited by 18,594
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy
Fukuyama, F., & Schumpeter, J. A. (1997) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20048211 · Cited by 15,264
Hotelling, H. (1929) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2224214 · Cited by 6,861
Hotelling, H. (1990) · The Collected Economics Articles of Harold Hotelling · doi:10.1007/978-1-4613-8905-7_4 · Cited by 5,677
Congress, The Electoral Connection
Ross, M. J., & Mayhew, D. R. (1975) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/447379 · Cited by 4,094
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.
Robinson, J., & Schumpeter, J. A. (1951) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2226618 · Cited by 3,565
Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy
Hibbs, D. A. (1977) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400269712 · Cited by 3,368
Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew
Page, B. I. (1975) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2148248 · Cited by 3,130
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.
Ginzberg, E., & Schumpeter, J. A. (1947) · Industrial and Labor Relations Review · doi:10.2307/2518575 · Cited by 2,483
Political Control of the Economy.
Grand, J. L., & Tufte, E. R. (1979) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2553106 · Cited by 1,306
Political Control of the Economy
Tufte, E. R. (1978) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691219417 · Cited by 1,197
Representatives, roll calls, and constituencies
Fiorina, M. P. (1974) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 754
Robertson, D. B. (1976) · Cited by 708
The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
(1918) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.48.1237.264 · Cited by 695
Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals
Mayhew, D. R. (1974) · Polity · doi:10.2307/3233931 · Cited by 586
Achen, C. H. (1978) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110458 · Cited by 500
The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems
Tufte, E. R. (1973) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1958782 · Cited by 471
Optimum Location in Spatial Competition
Smithies, A. (1941) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/255724 · Cited by 453
Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model
Wittman, D. (1977) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90091-6 · Cited by 403
Self-citationA dynamical model of political equilibrium
Kramer, G. H. (1977) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90011-4 · Cited by 387
Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
Hinich, M. J. (1977) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90005-9 · Cited by 378
An Empirical Study of Politico-Economic Interaction in the United States
Frey, B. S., & SCHNEIDER, F. G. (1978) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1924970 · Cited by 365
Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections
Mann, T. E., & Wolfinger, R. E. (1980) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1958145 · Cited by 326
The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It
Fiorina, M. P. (1977) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400259376 · Cited by 309
A Method of Scaling with Applications to the 1968 and 1972 Presidential Elections
Aldrich, J. H., & McKelvey, R. D. (1977) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400259339 · Cited by 301
Probability models of collective decision making
Niemi, R. G., & Weisberg, H. F. (1972) · Merrill eBooks · Cited by 286
Nonvoting and the existence of equilibrium under majority rule
Hinich, M. J., Ledyard, J. O., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1972) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(72)90145-7 · Cited by 197
Representativeness and Elections: A Policy Analysis
Kuklinski, J. H. (1978) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1953606 · Cited by 183
Plurality Maximization vs Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation
Hinich, M. J., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1970) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1953462 · Cited by 157
Parties, Administrations, and American Macroeconomic Outcomes
Beck, N. L. (1982) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400186058 · Cited by 149
Representational Role, Constituency Opinion, and Legislative Roll-Call Behavior
Kuklinski, J. H., & Elling, R. C. (1977) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110452 · Cited by 143
A Comparison of Voting for U.S. Senator and Representative in 1978
Abramowitz, A. I. (1980) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1958146 · Cited by 137
Internal processes governing party positions in elections
Coleman, J. S. (1971) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf01726211 · Cited by 126
Cummings, M. C. (1979) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2149635 · Cited by 102
Participation, Political Structure, and Concurrence
Hansen, S. B. (1975) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1955280 · Cited by 72
Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Optimization
Keech, W. R. (1980) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110869 · Cited by 37
Ideology, public approval, and government behavior
Lau, L. J., & Frey, B. S. (1971) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf01718620 · Cited by 21
Cited by
Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition
Lindbeck, A., & Weibull, J. W. (1987) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00116710 · Cited by 1,611
A Directional Theory of Issue Voting
Rabinowitz, G., & Macdonald, S. E. (1989) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956436 · Cited by 1,293
Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1996) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297852 · Cited by 1,036
A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics
Bawn, K., Cohen, M., Karol, D., Masket, S., Noel, H., & Zaller, J. (2012) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592712001624 · Cited by 859
A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage
Groseclose, T. (2001) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669329 · Cited by 754
Metadata
- Authors
- Wittman, D.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1983-03
- Volume
- 77
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 142-157
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2040898367
- Cited by
- 844
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 62.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.