The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies
Abstract
One important proposition about the distribution of coalition payoffs is found in W. A. Gamson's theory of coalition formation: “Any participant will expect others to demand from a coalition a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources which they contribute to a coalition.” This proposition is tested in a universe of cabinet coalitions existing in thirteen European democracies during the postwar period. Here, payoffs to partners are indicated by the percentage share of cabinet ministries received by parties for their percentage contribution of parliamentary seats/votes to the coalition. The proportionality proposition is shown to hold strongly. Disproportionality, however, is observed to occur in distributions at the extremities of party size—large parties tend to be proportionately underpaid and small parties overpaid, the larger or smaller they become. This effect, however, is most pronounced when the size of the coalition is small, and tends to reverse itself as the size of the coalition increases.
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Citations
Cites
The Theory of Political Coalitions
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Browne, E. C. (1971) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/001041407100300401 · Cited by 47
Self-citation
Cited by
Tsebelis, G. (1995) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123400007225 · Cited by 2,605
Congruence between Citizens and Policymakers in Two Visions of Liberal Democracy
Huber, J. D., & Powell, G. B. (1994) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2950684 · Cited by 680
Elections, Parties, Democracy: Conferring the Median Mandate
McDonald, M. D., & Budge, I. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199286728.001.0001 · Cited by 342
Bäck, H., Debus, M., & Dumont, P. (2011) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01980.x · Cited by 315
Left–right party ideology and government policies: A meta–analysis
Imbeau, L. M., Pétry, F., & Lamari, M. (2001) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1023/a:1011889915999 · Cited by 286
The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas
Neto, O. A. (2006) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414005282381 · Cited by 268
Metadata
- Authors
- Browne, E. C., & Franklin, M. N.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1973-06
- Volume
- 67
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 453-469
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2142200626
- Cited by
- 410
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 24.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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