The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Joint Production of Confidence: Endogenous Regulation and Nineteenth Century Commercial-Bank Clearinghouses
Abstract
During the nineteenth century, deposits increased relative to bank notes, c ausing increased information-asymmetry problems in banking. This pape r describes how bank clearinghouses lowered these costs by monitoring bank activities and establishing mechanisms of managerial control, i n effect "regulating" bank behavior. Such actions enforced the loca l one-to-one exchange rate between deposits and specie. Clearinghouse s increased regulation during financial panics, creating and enforcin g a risk-sharing device (loan certificates) for addressing panic-rela ted information problems. This paper concludes that "the market's" capacity to control bank managers depends on the banking product mix, and more generally, on information costs. Copyright 1987 by Ohio State University Press.
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Cites
Coase, R. H. (1937) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x · Cited by 23,972
Cited by
Securitized banking and the run on repo
Gorton, G., & Metrick, A. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.016 · Cited by 1,705
Self-citationBANKING PANICS AND BUSINESS CYCLES *
GORTON, G. (1988) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041885 · Cited by 905
Self-citationA theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation
Acharya, V. V. (2009) · Journal of Financial Stability · doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2009.02.001 · Cited by 664
Regulating the Shadow Banking System
Gorton, G., & Metrick, A. (2010) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity · doi:10.1353/eca.2010.0016 · Cited by 561
Self-citationGorton, G. (2008) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w14358 · Cited by 360
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gorton, G., & Mullineaux, D. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1987-11
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 457
- ISSN
- 0022-2879 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2061974772
- Cited by
- 233
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 17.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.