Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order

Abstract

Robert Kagan asserts that on international issues, are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus (p. 3). Picking up on classical gender associations recirculated by John Gray's advice books, this catchphrase projects onto transatlantic relations sexy notions about supposed differences between men and women. analogy mobilizes conventional assumptions about supposed biological determinants of sexual difference in support of what Kagan sees as another essential truth: The United and Europe are fundamentally different today (p. 6). Although Kagan's analysis is in places sophisticated, it relies on narrow, even simplistic, concepts of power, strength, and weakness. While Kagan finds power the all important question (p. 3), he considers only military power efficacious. In his supposedly realistic world, neither economic and political pressures, nor cultural influence and ideology (save for ideas about use of military force) have much impact. Kagan discusses rise of Nazis without reference Great Depression, which elevated what had remained minor party during German prosperity. Nor does he mention that until 1939, leaders in Western democracies appreciated internal order secured by fascism in Italy and Germany while they worried that another war would spawn communist revolutions. Ignoring such textbook history, Kagan focuses on what he calls psychologies of power and weakness: in inter-war period, a frightened France and the traumatized British (p. 12) tried to make virtue out of weakness (p. 13). This narrow view of power and motivation fits book's rhetorical structure: simplifying, polarized depiction of post-Cold War era. In this setup, robust Americans act on realism, while less manly Europeans display fundamental and enduring weakness (p. 28), military impotence (p. 46), and an anemic foreign policy (p. 65). Rejecting power, Europeans opt instead for exuberant idealism (p. 60) and and more shrill..,. attacks on United States (p. 100). Kagan stresses Europe's relative weakness, reiterating point on almost every page. By depicting Europe's post-1989 decision not match American spending on advanced weapons as failure of will that led inadequacies (p. 24), he denigrates non-military power while justifying Washington's actions. Given weak Europe ... United has no choice but act unilaterally (p. 99). Kagan argues that Europeans, sheltered by Washington from brutal laws of power politics(p. 58), are settling into their postmodern paradise and proselytizing for their of international law and international institutions (p. 76). While such doctrines appear author and many in Washington as indulgent idealism, worldly Cold Warriors such as Dean Acheson they appeared as useful adjuncts American hegemony. Despite sneer at Europe and at norms of peace and cooperation still held by most Americans, Kagan's ultimate target lies outside laws of