The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China

Abstract

Acknowledgments Formal Authority Relations Among Central Communist Party and Government Institutions in the People's Republic of China PART 1. INTRODUCTION 1. The Political Logic of Economic Reform 2. The Prereform Chinese Economy and the Decision to Initiate Market Reforms PART 2. CHINESE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 3. Authority Relations: The Communist Party and the Government 4. Leadership Incentives:- Political Succession and Reciprocal Accountability 5. Bargaining Arena: The Government Bureaucracy 6. Who Is Enfranchised in the Policy-making Process? 7. Decision Rules: Delegation by Consensus 8. Chinese Political Institutions and the Path of Economic Reforms PART 3* ECONOMIC REFORM POLICY-MAKING 9. Playing to the Provinces: Fiscal Decentralization and the Politics of Reform 10. Creating Vested Interests in Reform: Industrial Reform Takeoff, 1978-81 11. Leadership Succession and Policy Conflict: The Choice Between Profit Contracting and Substituting Tax-for-Profit, 1982-83 221 12. Building Bureaucratic Consensus: Formulating the Tax-for-Profit Policy, 1983-84 13. The Power of Particularism: Abortive Price Reform and the Revival of Profit Contracting, 1985-88 PART 4* CONCLUSION 14. The Political Lessons of Economic Reform in China Bibliography Index