The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Deterrence Theory Revisited
Abstract
Because of its parsimony and power, deterrence theory is the most important American theory of international relations. Yet it has many faults. The boundaries outside of which it does not apply are not clear; it does not tell how a state can change an adversary's motives; it does not deal with the use of rewards. Current scholarship of the third wave of deterrence theory, including George and Smoke's Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, has increased our knowledge by providing empirical evidence on when and how deterrence fails. Examination of the details of decision making reveals the ways in which attempts to deter can go wrong. Recent work stresses the role of each side's intrinsic interest in an issue, and argues that earlier formulations of the theory exaggerated the importance of commitment. The third wave also introduces a larger political element by focusing attention on states' goals and the context of their behavior.
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Citations
Cites
Schelling, T. C. (1960) · Cited by 7,672
Perception and Misperception in International Politics
Jervis, R. (2017) · doi:10.1515/9781400885114 · Cited by 3,199
Self-citationThe Logic of Images in International Relations.
Angell, R. C., & Jervis, R. (1972) · Social Forces · doi:10.2307/2576152 · Cited by 704
Self-citationHead, R. G., Snyder, G. H., & Diesing, P. (1978) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20040005 · Cited by 467
The limits of coercive diplomacy
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Snyder, G. H. (1961) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400877164 · Cited by 424
Kahn, H. (1961) · Worldview · doi:10.1017/s0084255900002813 · Cited by 334
Russett, B. M. (1972) · Cited by 330
The Power of Positive Sanctions
Baldwin, D. A. (1971) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2009705 · Cited by 275
HOLSTI, O. R. (1972) · McGill-Queen's University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctt1w1vktc · Cited by 203
Cited by
The Evolution of International Security Studies
Buzan, B., & Hansen, L. (2009) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511817762 · Cited by 1,238
The Renaissance of Security Studies
Walt, S. M. (1991) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2600471 · Cited by 1,074
INTRAGROUP CONFLICT IN ORGANIZATIONS: A CONTINGENCY PERSPECTIVE ON THE CONFLICT-OUTCOME RELATIONSHIP
Jehn, K. A., & Bendersky, C. (2003) · Research in Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0191-3085(03)25005-x · Cited by 881
War and Peace in International Rivalry
Diehl, P., & Goertz, G. (2000) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.16693 · Cited by 504
Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace
Nye, J. S. (2017) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec_a_00266 · Cited by 488
Metadata
- Authors
- Jervis, R.
- Venue
- World Politics
- Publisher
- Project MUSE
- Published
- 1979-01
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 289-324
- ISSN
- 0043-8871 (ISSN-L)
- 1086-3338
- OpenAlex
- W2099408182
- Cited by
- 391
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 63.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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