The DOI matches its Crossref record.
What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980
Abstract
The article develops an expected-utility model of extended deterrence and tests it on 54 historical cases. Successful deterrence is associated with close economic and political ties between the defender and the state it is trying to protect, and with a local military balance in favor of the defender. Deterrence success is not systematically associated with the presence of a military alliance, with the overall strategic military balance, with possession of nuclear weapons, or with the defender's firmness or lack of it in previous crises. If deterrence fails, only alliance and the military value of the state under attack are associated with the defender's willingness to go to war.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?
Dobbin, F., Simmons, B., & Garrett, G. (2007) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.33.090106.142507 · Cited by 1,379
Cheap fights, credible threats: The future of armed drones and coercion
Zegart, A. (2020) · Journal of Strategic Studies · doi:10.1080/01402390.2018.1439747 · Cited by 81
What Does It Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International Conflict
Narang, V. (2013) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002712448909 · Cited by 58
Metadata
- Authors
- Huth, P., & Russett, B.
- Venue
- World Politics
- Publisher
- Project MUSE
- Published
- 1984-07
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 496-526
- ISSN
- 0043-8871 (ISSN-L)
- 1086-3338
- OpenAlex
- W4247040884
- Cited by
- 343
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 28.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2010184
- The paper
- Huth, P., & Russett, B. (1984). What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980. World Politics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010184
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
