Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: some comparative evidence
Abstract
This note uses information on a sample of sixteen OECD countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance. As previous work suggests, politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation. However, the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth, unemployment, or the ex ante real interest rate. Copyright 1993 by Ohio State University Press.
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A monetary authority with greater autonomy is associated with lower and more stable inflation.
“Cross-country evidence finds that a monetary authority with greater autonomy is associated with lower and more stable inflation.”
From Threats to central bank independence: High-frequency identification with twitter (2023) · cites this paper as Alesina and Summers (1993)
Most older studies, which generally used simple cross-country bivariate regressions for particular periods, reported that CBI was negatively correlated with average inflation.
“Most of the older studies, which generally used simple cross-country bivariate regressions for particular periods, reported that CBI was negatively correlated with average inflation (see, for instance, Alesina and Summers, 1993).”
From INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: A META-REGRESSION ANALYSIS (2010) · cites this paper as Alesina and Summers, 1993
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References 11 · Cited by 1,833
- Authors
- Alesina, A., & Summers, L. H.
- Venue
- Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-05
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 151
- ISSN
- 0022-2879 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1991865067
- Cited by
- 1,833
- References
- 11
- Citations by year
- 2026: 45 · 2025: 75 · 2024: 60 · 2023: 37 · 2022: 44 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 110 · 2019: 62 · 2018: 67 · 2017: 39 · 2016: 51 · 2015: 54 · 2014: 36 · 2013: 75 · 2012: 61
- FWCI
- 114.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of money credit and banking (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Global Financial Crisis and Policies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
- Keywords
- central bank independence, macroeconomic performance, inflation volatility, inflation, economic growth, unemployment, real interest rates, monetary policy
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