The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Dynamics of Cosponsorship
Abstract
Electoral-connection theories of legislative politics view bill cosponsorship as low-cost position taking by rational legislators who communicate with target audiences (e.g., constituents) external to the legislature. Legislative signaling games suggest a view of bill cosponsorship in which early cosponsors attempt to communicate to target audiences (e.g., the median voter) within the legislature. Using data from the 103rd U.S. House of Representatives, we show that the timing of legislators' cosponsorship decisions are more supportive of cosponsorship as intralegislative signaling than as extralegislative position taking. First, policy extremists on both sides of the political spectrum are more likely than moderates to be initial endorsers of legislative initiatives. Second, extremist-moderate differences diminish over the course of bill histories.
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Cites
Congress, The Electoral Connection
Ross, M. J., & Mayhew, D. R. (1975) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/447379 · Cited by 4,094
Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew
Page, B. I. (1975) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2148248 · Cited by 3,130
Information and Legislative Organization
Krehbiel, K. (1991) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.8850 · Cited by 1,718
Self-citationUnemployment Insurance And Unemployment Spells
Meyer, B. (1988) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w2546 · Cited by 1,270
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Meyer, B. D. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938349 · Cited by 1,178
Flexible parametric estimation of duration and competing risk models
Han, A., & Hausman, J. A. (1990) · Journal of Applied Econometrics · doi:10.1002/jae.3950050102 · Cited by 619
Senators as Political Entrepreneurs: Using Bill Sponsorship to Shape Legislative Agendas
Schiller, W. J. (1995) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111763 · Cited by 406
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Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous
Gilligan, T. W., & Krehbiel, K. (1989) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111156 · Cited by 396
Self-citationArtificial Extremism in Interest Group Ratings
Snyder, J. M. (1992) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/439733 · Cited by 197
Cited by
Connecting the Congress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks
Fowler, J. H. (2006) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/pan/mpl002 · Cited by 532
Position Taking and Cosponsorship in the U.S. House
KOGER, G. (2003) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.3162/036298003x200872 · Cited by 295
Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving
Adler, E. S., & Wilkerson, J. D. (2013) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139150842 · Cited by 280
Comparing Cosponsorship and Roll‐Call Ideal Points
ALEMÁN, E., CALVO, E., JONES, M. P., & KAPLAN, N. (2009) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.3162/036298009787500358 · Cited by 125
Zelizer, A. (2018) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/lsq.12206 · Cited by 53
Metadata
- Authors
- Kessler, D., & Krehbiel, K.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1996-09
- Volume
- 90
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 555-566
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2040906888
- Cited by
- 261
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 9.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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