A Theory of Coalition Formation
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Abstract
Coalition formation is a pervasive aspect of social life. This paper presents a theory of coalition formation with a statement of conditions and assumptions. While applicable to groups of varying sizes, it is shown to be consistent with Caplow's theory of coalitions in the triad. It successfully handles the experimental results of Vinacke and Arkoff. Finally, the applicability of various work in n-person game theory is discussed with the conclusion that, in its present state, it fails to provide a basis for a descriptive theory of coalitions.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gamson, W. A.
- Corresponding author
- Gamson, William A.
- Venue
- American Sociological Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1961-06
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 373
- ISSN
- 0003-1224 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2079189411
- Cited by
- 1,070
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 22 · 2025: 45 · 2024: 31 · 2023: 69 · 2022: 35 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 35 · 2019: 41 · 2018: 30 · 2017: 46 · 2016: 30 · 2015: 29 · 2014: 41 · 2013: 42 · 2012: 45
- FWCI
- 36.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Sociological Review (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social Power and Status Dynamics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Contemporary Sociological Theory and Practice
- Keywords
- coalition formation, group formation, social groups, group size
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