The DOI matches its Crossref record.
A Strategic Motivation for Commodity Bundling
Abstract
The analytical literature on commodity bundling explains the practice of selling two or more differentiated products in a single package as a surrogate for direct price discrimination. In contrast, this paper shows that imperfect competition creates a strategic incentive to bundle. The profitability of bundling, whether it adversely affects rival producers, and whether it yields an overall efficiency gain depends inter alia on the nature of product market competition. The role of complementarity in explaining why firms bundle is also explored. Copyright 1990 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Citations
Cited by
Goldfarb, A., & Tucker, C. (2019) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20171452 · Cited by 2,744
Strategic Bundling of Products and Prices: A New Synthesis for Marketing
Stremersch, S., & Tellis, G. J. (2002) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1509/jmkg.66.1.55.18455 · Cited by 788
Nalebuff, B. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355304772839551 · Cited by 531
Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion
Whinston, M. (1989) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w2995 · Cited by 528
Chapter 34 Price Discrimination and Competition
Stole, L. A. (2007) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03034-2 · Cited by 309
Venkatesh, R., & Kamakura, W. (2003) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/367748 · Cited by 301
Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination
Armstrong, M. (2013) · Advances in Economics and Econometrics · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139052276.006 · Cited by 267
Metadata
- Authors
- Carbajo, J., de Meza, D., & Seidmann, D. J.
- Venue
- The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1990-03
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 283
- ISSN
- 0022-1821 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2170921639
- Cited by
- 237
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 10.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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