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Optimal Procurement Mechanisms

Manelli, Alejandro M., Vincent, Daniel R. · 1995 · Econometrica

Abstract

We analyze optimal mechanisms in environments where sellers are privately informed about quality. A methodology is provided for deriving conditions that are necessary and sufficient to determine when two simple trading environments maximize either social or private surplus. The commonly used auction mechanism is frequently inefficient in procurement environments. Often, the optimal mechanism is simply to order potential suppliers and to tender take-it-or-leave-it offers to each sequentially. We completely characterize the environments in which either mechanism is optimal. In doing so, we develop a general methodology that determines when and if a given trading institution is optimal.

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Metadata

Authors
Manelli, A. M., & Vincent, D. R.
Venue
Econometrica
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1995-05
Volume
63
Issue
3
Pages
591
ISSN
0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1591765456
Cited by
176
References
0
FWCI
2.71
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Optimal Procurement Mechanisms. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2171909
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Manelli, A. M., & Vincent, D. R. (1995). Optimal Procurement Mechanisms. Econometrica. https://doi.org/10.2307/2171909

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.