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Equilibrium Wage Distributions
Open accessAbstract
This paper analyzes equilibrium in labor markets with costly search.Even in steady state equilibrium, identical labor may receive different wages; this may be the case even when the only source of imperfect information is the inequality of wages which the market is perpetuating.When there are information imperfections arising from (symmetric) differences in non-pecuniary characteristics of jobs and preferences of individuals, there will not in general exist a full employment, zero profit single wage equilibrium.There are, in general, a multiplicity of equilbria.Equilibrium may be characterized by unemployment; in spite of the presence of an excess supply of labor, no firm is willing to hire workers at a lower wage.It knows that if it does so, the quit rate will be higher, and hence turnover costs (training costs) will be higher, so much so that profits will actually be lower.The model thus provides a rationale for real wage rigidity.The model also provides a theory of equilibrium frictional unemployment.Though the constrained optimality (taking explicitly into account the costs associated with obtaining information and search) may entail unemployment and wage dispersion, the levels of unemployment and wage dispersion in the market equilibrium will not, in general, be (constrained) optimaL
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Citations
Cites
On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets
Stiglitz, J. E., & Grossman, S. J. (1980) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8765r99 · Cited by 3,645
Self-citation
Cited by
The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics
Stiglitz, J. E. (2000) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555015 · Cited by 1,469
Self-citationInformation and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics
Stiglitz, J. E. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260136363 · Cited by 1,455
Self-citationIndustry Rents: Evidence and Implications
Katz, L. F., Summers, L. H., Hall, R. E., Schultze, C. L., & Topel, R. H. (1989) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics · doi:10.2307/2534722 · Cited by 614
Optimal Tax Progressivity: An Analytical Framework*
Heathcote, J., Storesletten, K., & Violante, G. L. (2017) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjx018 · Cited by 595
New methods for analyzing structural models of labor force dynamics
Flinn, C., & Heckman, J. (1982) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/0304-4076(82)90097-5 · Cited by 535
Metadata
- Authors
- Stiglitz, J. E.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1985-09
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 379
- Pages
- 595
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2095723217
- Cited by
- 219
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 21.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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