The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
Abstract
A risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know, but may verify through a costly auditing procedure. We characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities, subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent. The main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agent's wealth, audit probabilities are decreasing in the agent's wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities. In general, such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit.
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Cites
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
Myerson, R. B. (1981) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.6.1.58 · Cited by 5,920
An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
Mirrlees, J. A. (1971) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296779 · Cited by 4,375
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms
Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261392 · Cited by 1,206
The Optimum Enforcement of Laws
Stigler, G. J. (1970) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259646 · Cited by 1,147
Monopoly with Incomplete Information
Maskin, E., & Riley, J. (1984) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555674 · Cited by 1,140
Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
Maskin, E. S., & Riley, J. G. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913516 · Cited by 746
Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework
Reinganum, J. F., & Wilde, L. L. (1985) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(85)90035-0 · Cited by 446
The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement
Graetz, M. J., Reinganum, J. F., & Wilde, L. L. (1986) · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036900 · Cited by 395
Cited by
Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence
Knowles, J., Persico, N., & Todd, P. (2001) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/318603 · Cited by 608
Metadata
- Authors
- Border, K. C., & Sobel, J.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1987-10
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 525
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2050379411
- Cited by
- 332
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 2.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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