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International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy
Abstract
This paper presents a theory of government intervention which provides an explanation for “industrial strategy” policies such as R & D or export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets. Domestic net welfare is improved by the capture of a greater share of the output of rent earning industries, although the subsidy-ridden noncooperative international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal. Behaviour of governments and firms is modelled as a three stage subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The assumption that the government is the first player in this game allows it to influence equilibrium outcomes by altering the set of credible actions open to firms.
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Citations
Cited by
Foreign investment and technology transfer
Wang, J.-Y., & Blomström, M. (1992) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(92)90021-n · Cited by 601
Chapter 31 Regional economic integration
Baldwin, R. E., & Venables, A. J. (1995) · Handbook of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s1573-4404(05)80011-5 · Cited by 554
Bagwell, K., Bown, C. P., & Staiger, R. W. (2016) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20151192 · Cited by 122
Industrial targeting, experimentation and long-run specialization
Klimenko, M. M. (2004) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2002.09.001 · Cited by 38
Metadata
- Authors
- Spencer, B. J., & Brander, J. A.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1983-10
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 707
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121574387
- Cited by
- 776
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 27.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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How to cite
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2297771
- The paper
- Spencer, B. J., & Brander, J. A. (1983). International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy. The Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297771
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
