The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Joint Projects without Commitment
Abstract
This paper concerns the pattern of contributions to a joint project when commitments and enforceable contracts are not available. We analyse a game in which partners alternate in making contributions to the project until the project is completed. Contributions are sunk when they are made. The game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium path, which is inefficient in the sense that socially desirable projects may not be completed. By contrast, in a “subscription game” in which the cost of the contribution is borne only if and when the contributions committed to the project cover its cost, the outcome is efficient.
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Citations
Cites
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Smith, J. M. (1988) · Did Darwin Get It Right? · doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-7862-4_22 · Cited by 7,906
Schelling, T. C. (1960) · Cited by 7,672
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Rubinstein, A. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912531 · Cited by 5,264
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Selten, R. (1975) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766400 · Cited by 3,337
Hart, O., & Holmström, B. (1987) · Advances in Economic Theory · doi:10.1017/ccol0521340446.003 · Cited by 1,330
Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
Bagnoli, M., & Lipman, B. L. (1989) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297502 · Cited by 518
Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race
Harris, C., & Vickers, J. (1985) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297616 · Cited by 352
Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good
Bliss, C., & Nalebuff, B. (1984) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(84)90041-0 · Cited by 303
Sequential Provision of Public Goods
Varian, H. R. (1990) · Cadmus - EUI Research Repository (European University Institute) · Cited by 12
Cited by
2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
Ledyard, J. O. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-004 · Cited by 1,033
Selling to Socially Responsible Consumers: Competition and The Private Provision of Public Goods
Bagnoli, M., & Watts, S. G. (2003) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00419.x · Cited by 583
Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
Keller, G., Rady, S., & Cripps, M. (2005) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00564.x · Cited by 463
Toward a Theory of Charitable Fund‐Raising
Andreoni, J. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250044 · Cited by 398
Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement
MacLeod, W. B. (2007) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.45.3.595 · Cited by 384
Metadata
- Authors
- Admati, A. R., & Perry, M.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1991-04
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 259
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2012019472
- Cited by
- 286
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 4.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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