Cited by 1,666Corporate Finance and GovernanceOrganizational Management and LeadershipAccounting and Organizational Management

The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems

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JENSEN, MICHAEL C.·1993·The Journal of Finance

Abstract

Since 1973 technological, political, regulatory, and economic forces have been changing the worldwide economy in a fashion comparable to the changes experienced during the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution. As in the nineteenth century, we are experiencing declining costs, increasing average (but decreasing marginal) productivity of labor, reduced growth rates of labor income, excess capacity, and the requirement for downsizing and exit. The last two decades indicate corporate internal control systems have failed to deal effectively with these changes, especially slow growth and the requirement for exit. The next several decades pose a major challenge for Western firms and political systems as these forces continue to work their way through the worldwide economy.

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  • Existing managers often take actions-poison pills-that deter takeovers and weaken the market as an effective disciplining device.

    “Third, existing managers often take actions -poison pills -that deter takeovers and weaken the market as an effective disciplining device”

    From Finance, Growth, and Inequality (2021) · cites this paper as Jensen 1993

    The Conclusion says opposition from corporate managers helped shut down the market for corporate control through court decisions, state antitakeover amendments, and financing restrictions. It also describes that market as a source of discipline. Our copy does not say managers used poison pills specifically to deter takeovers. (LLM, conf=0.84)

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Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
JENSEN, M. C.
Affiliations
Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
JENSEN, MICHAEL C.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1993-07
Volume
48
Issue
3
Pages
831-880
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
OpenAlex
W4229772028
Cited by
1,666
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 38 · 2023: 75 · 2022: 78 · 2021: 90 · 2020: 83 · 2019: 83 · 2018: 75 · 2017: 58 · 2016: 86 · 2015: 43 · 2014: 46 · 2013: 44 · 2012: 54
FWCI
52.37
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
The Journal of Finance (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management of Technology and Innovation › Organizational Management and Leadership
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management Information Systems › Accounting and Organizational Management
Keywords
firm exit, labor income growth, overcapacity, downsizing, economic slowdown, corporate governance, structural change in the economy

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