The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Credible Pretrial Negotiation
Abstract
Pretrial negotiation is a structured environment in which to study bargaining with incomplete information. When a plaintiff believes that a defendant owes him damages, he may first attempt to reach a private settlement before resorting to a costly court-imposed judgment. A central issue in their negotiations is whether the plaintiff's threat to litigate is credible. It is possible for the plaintiff to undermine the credibility of his litigation threat by making a settlement demand that is insufficient. As a result, the plaintiff must raise his settlement demand to limit the amount of bad news he can learn if his offer is rejected. When this credibility constraint is binding, traditional comparative static results are reversed. In addition, even though the defendant is being sued, he wants the plaintiff's threat to be credible.
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Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Increasing risk: I. A definition
Rothschild, M., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1970) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(70)90038-4 · Cited by 3,829
The Selection of Disputes for Litigation
Priest, G. L., & Klein, B. (1984) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/467732 · Cited by 1,277
Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information
Bebchuk, L. A. (1984) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555448 · Cited by 901
Cited by
Conservatism and Auditor-Client Negotiations
Antle, R., & Nalebuff, B. (1991) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491002 · Cited by 464
Self-citationDomestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violation
Powell, E. J., & Staton, J. K. (2009) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.01527.x · Cited by 371
Metadata
- Authors
- Nalebuff, B.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1987
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 198
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2056599827
- Cited by
- 293
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 6.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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