The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Good Regulatory Regimes
Abstract
Assuming simple functional forms, numerical methods are used to analyze linear regulatory rules that include cost-plus and price-cap regimes. Regulators are assumed to observe actual cost, but not the disutility of cost reduction, and are assumed unable to impose taxes or make transfers. Best linear regimes depend importantly on the level and form of uncertainty, the regulatory objective function, and the firm profitability constraint. Under uncertainty, regimes in which price depends in part on actual cost generally substantially outperform pure price caps, particularly in terms of consumers' surplus.
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“Indeed, menus of contracts, profit-sharing or sliding-scale arrangements (Lyon, 1996), and ratchets are likely to provide a better balance between performance incentives and rent extraction goals (e.g., Laffont & Tirole, 1993; Schmalensee, 1989).”
From The Expansion of Incentive (Performance-Based) Regulation of Electricity Distribution and Transmission in the United States (2024) · cites this paper as Schmalensee, 1989
Citations
Cites
Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
Holmstrom, B. R., & Milgrom, P. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913238 · Cited by 2,870
A Theory of Yardstick Competition
Shleifer, A. (1985) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555560 · Cited by 1,414
Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms
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Feldstein, M. S. (1972) · American Economic Review · Cited by 251
Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutionsPreprint
Baron, D. P. (1989) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 243
Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions
Caillaud, B., Guesnerie, R., Rey, P., & Jean Tirole, Z. (1988) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555394 · Cited by 169
Pareto-Superior Nonlinear Outlay Schedules
Willig, R. D. (1978) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003612 · Cited by 162
The control of natural monopolies
Schmalensee, R. (1979) · Cited by 114
Self-citationRegulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand and Cost Functions
Lewis, T. R., & Sappington, D. E. M. (1988) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555666 · Cited by 94
Mathios, A., & Rogers, R. P. (1989) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555581 · Cited by 92
Price Cap Regulation of Telecommunications Services: A Long-Run Approach
Vogelsang, I. (1989) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-6897-7_3 · Cited by 87
Monitoring of Performance in Organizational Contracting: The Case of Defense Procurement
Baron, D. P., & Besanko, D. A. (1988) · Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3440312 · Cited by 32
(1986) · bepress Legal Repository
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1 of the 15 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.
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Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization
Joskow, P. L. (2008) · The Energy Journal · doi:10.5547/issn0195-6574-ej-vol29-nosi2-3 · Cited by 702
Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation
Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. M. (2007) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03027-5 · Cited by 421
Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization
Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. M. (2006) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.44.2.325 · Cited by 391
Crocker, K. J., & Masten, S. E. (1996) · Journal of Regulatory Economics · doi:10.1007/bf00134817 · Cited by 215
Incentive Regulation and Its Application to Electricity Networks
Joskow, P. L. (2008) · Review of Network Economics · doi:10.2202/1446-9022.1161 · Cited by 181
Metadata
- Authors
- Schmalensee, R.
- Corresponding author
- Schmalensee, Richard
- ORCID
- Schmalensee, Richard
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1989
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 417
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2072067086
- Cited by
- 191
- References
- 15
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 4 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 2.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The RAND Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Public Administration › Regulation and Compliance Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Legal and Constitutional Studies
- Keywords
- regulatory regimes, price cap regulation, uncertainty, consumer surplus, regulatory objectives, natural monopoly regulation
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