The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard
Abstract
This article explores a model of warranties in which moral hazard problems play a key role. The goal is to understand the important characteristics of warranties, including their provision of incomplete insurance and the relationship between product quality and coverage. We analyze a model in which buyers and sellers take actions that affect a product's performance. Since these actions are not cooperatively determined, an incentives problem arises. We characterize the optimal warranty contract and undertake comparative statics to determine the predicted correlation of warranty coverage and product quality.
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Citations
Cited by
Bergen, M., Dutta, S., & Walker, O. C. (1992) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1177/002224299205600301 · Cited by 1,105
Biswas, D., & Biswas, A. (2004) · Journal of Interactive Marketing · doi:10.1002/dir.20010 · Cited by 294
Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace
Dur, R., Non, A., & Roelfsema, H. (2010) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2010.05.001 · Cited by 50
Metadata
- Authors
- Cooper, R., & Ross, T. W.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1985
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 103
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1975035024
- Cited by
- 367
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 3.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2555592
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- Cooper, R., & Ross, T. W. (1985). Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard. The RAND Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555592
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
