The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Trade Association Disclosure Rules, Incentives to Share Information, and Welfare
Abstract
In this article I propose a monopolistic competition framework to analyze the effects of different disclosure rules used by trade associations on the incentives to share information and on the welfare of consumers, firms, and society. This framework is appropriate whenever a single firm cannot influence aggregate market magnitudes, and serves as a benchmark for the analysis of information-pooling agreements abstracting from strategic considerations. I report two main results. First, a policy of nonexclusionary disclosure destroys the incentives to share information, while exclusionary disclosure preserves them. Second, information sharing increases expected total surplus with Cournot competition but decreases it with Bertrand competition in the context of a Quadratic-Normal model with demand uncertainty.
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Cites
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003562 · Cited by 3,123
Cited by
Rindfleisch, A., & Moorman, C. (2001) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1509/jmkg.65.2.1.18253 · Cited by 1,030
Agglomeration and Trade Revisited*
Ottaviano, G., Tabuchi, T., & Thisse, J. (2002) · International Economic Review · doi:10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00021 · Cited by 929
The Productivity Advantages of Large Cities: Distinguishing Agglomeration From Firm Selection
(2012) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta8442 · Cited by 882
Information Sharing in Credit Markets
PAGANO, M., & JAPPELLI, T. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb05125.x · Cited by 767
Efficient Use of Information and Social�Value�of�Information
Angeletos, G.-M., & Pavan, A. (2007) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00783.x · Cited by 619
Metadata
- Authors
- Vives, X.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1990
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 409
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1996771704
- Cited by
- 233
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 8.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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