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If OSHA is So Bad, Why is Compliance So Good?
Open accessAbstract
Since its inception more than twenty years ago, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has been the subject of an intense public debate on its effectiveness. This article analyzes the determinants of establishment-level compliance with specific safety and health standards as a means of assessing the agency's effectiveness. The empirical results suggest that OSHA has had large impacts on business compliance behavior, despite its low regulatory profile. These results indicate that government regulatory agencies can substantially change private-sector behavior, even given limited regulatory resources.
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Cited by
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Locke, R. M., Qin, F., & Brause, A. (2007) · ILR Review · doi:10.1177/001979390706100101 · Cited by 549
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(2014) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.51-6280 · Cited by 415
Expanding research on the economics of occupational health
Leigh, J. P. (2006) · Scandinavian Journal of Work, Environment & Health · doi:10.5271/sjweh.969 · Cited by 333
Greenwash: Corporate Environmental Disclosure under Threat of Audit
Lyon, T. P., & Maxwell, J. W. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.938988 · Cited by 267
Johnson, M. S. (2020) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20180501 · Cited by 246
Metadata
- Authors
- Weil, D.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1996
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 618
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1969015590
- Cited by
- 167
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 3.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.