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Protecting the Environment When Costs and Benefits are Privately Known
Open accessAbstract
I analyze different approaches for protecting the environment when stakeholders are privately informed about the costs and benefits of pollution reduction. The presence of asymmetric information calls for some important departures from the textbook prescriptions of marketable permits and emission taxes for controlling pollution. For instance, it may no longer be optimal to equate the social marginal benefits to the marginal cost of cleanup in determining appropriate abatement levels. I conclude this review with some suggestions for future research in this area.
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Cites
The New Economics of Organization
Moe, T. M. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110997 · Cited by 1,974
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Goulder, L. H., Parry, I. W. H., Williams III, R. C., & Burtraw, D. (1999) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(98)00109-1 · Cited by 528
Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection?
Segerson, K., & Miceli, T. J. (1998) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1006/jeem.1998.1040 · Cited by 511
Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy
Baron, D. P., & Diermeier, D. (2007) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2007.00152.x · Cited by 400
Disclosure Strategies for Pollution Control
Tietenberg, T. (1998) · Environmental and Resource Economics · doi:10.1023/a:1008291411492 · Cited by 373
Metadata
- Authors
- Lewis, T. R.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1996
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 819
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2029026737
- Cited by
- 184
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 19.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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