The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables
Abstract
To examine the traditional view that challenger spending is more effective than incumbent spending, I reestimate the effects of spending using instrumental variables that affect a candidate's ability to raise campaign funds, such as candidate wealth levels. When the endogeneity of candidate spending levels is properly taken into account, the marginal effects of incumbent and challenger spending are roughly equal. In contrast to previous research showing that, because of higher marginal returns to challenger spending, the incumbent's spending advantage cannot explain high incumbent reelection rates, this article shows that in an average Senate election the incumbent's spending advantage yields a 6% increase in the incumbent's vote share. That incumbent spending wins elections has direct implications regarding the consequences of campaign finance reform. My findings imply that equalizing spending levels may significantly increase incumbent defeat rates, and caps on candidate spending may improve the chances of challengers.
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Cites
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Cited by
IMAI, K., KEELE, L., TINGLEY, D., & YAMAMOTO, T. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055411000414 · Cited by 1,537
Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections
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Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science
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Instrumental Variables Estimation in Political Science: A Readers’ Guide: IV: A READERS’ GUIDE
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Is Vote Buying Effective? Evidence from a Field Experiment in West Africa
Vicente, P. C. (2014) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12086 · Cited by 365
Metadata
- Authors
- Gerber, A.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1998-06
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 401-411
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W1978469792
- Cited by
- 455
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 28.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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