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Fiscal Policy Outcomes and Electoral Accountability in American States
Abstract
Clear fiscal policy effects appear in American state gubernatorial and legislative elections between 1968 and 1992, independent of the effects of incumbency, coattails, term limits, and macroeconomic conditions. The results show that accountability is generally stronger following a period of unified party control than under divided government. Voter reactions to taxes and spending relative to the state economy are conditional on expectations, which differ for each party. Net of these expectations, Republican gubernatorial candidates lose votes if their party is responsible for unanticipated increases in the size of the state budget; Democrats do not and, indeed, may be rewarded for small increases. Independent of this, the incumbent governor's party is punished in legislative elections for failing to maintain fiscal balance. Taken together, these results show how electoral accountability for fiscal policy outcomes is strong but highly contingent on a complex configuration of party labels, partisan control, expectations, and institutions.
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Cites
Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies
Jones, M. P. (1996) · doi:10.1353/book.147213 · Cited by 279
Cited by
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Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries
Alt, J. E., & Lassen, D. D. (2006) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.04.001 · Cited by 584
Self-citationPolitical institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United States
Besley, T. (2002) · Working Paper Series · doi:10.1920/wp.ifs.2002.0213 · Cited by 577
Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries
Alt, J. E., & Lassen, D. D. (2006) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00200.x · Cited by 548
Self-citationRegulatory Competition and Environmental Enforcement: Is There a Race to the Bottom?
Konisky, D. M. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00285.x · Cited by 489
Metadata
- Authors
- Lowry, R. C., Alt, J. E., & Ferree, K. E.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1998-12
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 759-774
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2130924472
- Cited by
- 298
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 16.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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