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Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law
Abstract
Since the early 1970s a considerable number of multilateral agreements have been concluded in the environmental field that establish a common pattern of institutional arrangements. The purpose of these arrangements is to develop the normative content of the regulatory regime established by each agreement 1 and to supervise the states parties’ implementation of and compliance with that regime. These institutional arrangements usually comprise a conference or meeting of the parties (COP, MOP) with decision-making powers, a secretariat, and one or more specialist subsidiary bodies. Such arrangements, because of their ad hoc nature, are not intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in the traditional sense. On the other hand, as the creatures of treaties, such conferences and meetings of the parties, with their secretariats and subsidiary bodies, add up to more than just diplomatic conferences. Because such arrangements do not constitute traditional IGOs and yet are freestanding and distinct both from the states parties to a particular agreement and from existing IGOs, we have chosen to describe them as “autonomous.” They are also autonomous in the sense that they have their own lawmaking powers and compliance mechanisms.
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Cites
International organization: a state of the art on an art of the state
Kratochwil, F., & Ruggie, J. G. (1986) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300027363 · Cited by 1,109
International Institutional Law: Sixth Revised Edition
Schermers, H. G., & Blokker, N. M. (2018) · Brill | Nijhoff eBooks · doi:10.1163/9789004381650 · Cited by 719
The effect of international environmental institutions: how we might learn more
Bernauer, T. (1995) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300028423 · Cited by 210
The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments
Aust, A. (1986) · International and Comparative Law Quarterly · doi:10.1093/iclqaj/35.4.787 · Cited by 205
Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance
Sand, P. H. (1990) · bepress Legal Repository · Cited by 124
Cited by
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Russell, S., Dewey, D., & Tegmark, M. (2015) · AI Magazine · doi:10.1609/aimag.v36i4.2577 · Cited by 637
Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions
Charnovitz, S. (2001) · American Journal of International Law · doi:10.2307/2674626 · Cited by 193
Metadata
- Authors
- Churchill, R. R., & Ulfstein, G.
- Venue
- American Journal of International Law
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2000-10
- Volume
- 94
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 623-659
- ISSN
- 0002-9300 (ISSN-L)
- 2161-7953
- OpenAlex
- W2027748783
- Cited by
- 379
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 81.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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