Cited by 314Philosophy and History of SciencePhilosophy, Science, and HistoryEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

The Non-Governing Conception of Laws of Nature

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Beebee, Helen·2000·Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Abstract

Recently several thought experiments have been developed which have been alleged to refute the Ramsey-Lewis view of laws of nature. The paper aims to show that two such thought experiments fail to establish that the Ramsey-Lewis view is false, since they presuppose a conception of laws of nature that is radically at odds with the Humean conception of laws embodied by the Ramsey-Lewis view. In particular, the thought experiments presuppose that laws of nature govern the behavior of objects. The paper argues that the claim that laws govern should not be regarded as a conceptual truth, and shows how the governing conception of laws manifests itself in the thought experiments. Hence the thought experiments do not constitute genuine counter-examples to the Ramsey-Lewis view. since the Humean is free to reject the conception of laws which the thought experiments presuppose.

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Crossref · 10.2307/2653613

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References 15 · Cited by 314

Authors
Beebee, H.
Corresponding author
Beebee, Helen
Venue
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
2000-11
Volume
61
Issue
3
Pages
571
ISSN
0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1970256541
Cited by
314
References
15
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 19 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 42 · 2022: 39 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 14 · 2019: 62 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 16 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 3
FWCI
14.39
Type
journal article
Language
en
Licence
other-oa
Locations
  • Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (publishedVersion)
  • Research Explorer (The University of Manchester) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • White Rose Research Online (University of Leeds, The University of Sheffield, University of York) (submittedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
laws of nature, John Carroll, thought experiments, counterexample, conceptual truth, supervenience, metaphysics of law

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