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Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument
Abstract
This paper compares two kinds of epistemic principles-an underdetermination principle and a deductive closure principle. It argues that each principle provides the basis for an independently motivated skeptical argument. It examines the logical relations between the premises of the two kinds of skeptical argument and concludes that the deductive closure argument cannot be refuted without refuting the underdetermination argument. The underdetermination argument, however, can be refuted without refuting the deductive closure argument. In this respect, the deductive closure argument is the stronger of the two.
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Citations
Cited by
Pryor, J. (2000) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00277 · Cited by 1,127
Pritchard, D. (2005) · doi:10.1093/019928038x.001.0001 · Cited by 874
Metadata
- Authors
- Cohen, S.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1998-03
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 143
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2039431552
- Cited by
- 176
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 6.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Cohen, S. (1998). Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. https://doi.org/10.2307/2653634
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.