The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure
Abstract
Christian Leuz, Robert E. Verrecchia, The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, Supplement: Studies on Accounting Information and the Economics of the Firm (2000), pp. 91-124
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The most commonly discussed benefit of transparency is that it reduces asymmetric information, and hence lowers the cost of trading the firm's securities and the firm's cost of capital.
“The most commonly discussed benefit of transparency is that it reduces asymmetric information, and hence lowers the cost of trading the firm's securities and the firm's cost of capital.”
From Transparency and corporate governance (2014) · cites this paper as Leuz and Verrecchia (2000)
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References 36 · Cited by 2,370
- Authors
- Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. E.
- Affiliations
- Goethe University Frankfurt (DE)
- University of Pennsylvania (US)
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting Research
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2000
- Volume
- 38
- Pages
- 91
- ISSN
- 0021-8456 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121531922
- Cited by
- 2,370
- References
- 36
- Citations by year
- 2026: 129 · 2025: 119 · 2024: 136 · 2023: 129 · 2022: 127 · 2021: 135 · 2020: 124 · 2019: 110 · 2018: 130 · 2017: 105 · 2016: 107 · 2015: 124 · 2014: 110 · 2013: 108 · 2012: 109
- FWCI
- 82.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Accounting Research (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Accounting Theory and Financial Reporting
- Keywords
- voluntary disclosure, accounting information, information asymmetry, stock returns, corporate disclosure policy
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