The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
R&D Networks
Abstract
We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collaboration: bilateral agreements and nonexclusive relationships. Our analysis highlights the relationship between market competition, firms' incentives to invest in R&D, and the architecture of collaboration networks. In the absence of firm rivalry, the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable, industry-profit maximizing, and efficient. By contrast, under strong market rivalry the complete network is stable, but intermediate levels of collaboration and asymmetric networks are more attractive from a collective viewpoint. This suggests that competing firms may have excessive incentives to form collaborative links.
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Citations
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Cited by
Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player
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Bramoullé, Y., & Kranton, R. (2007) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.006 · Cited by 589
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Strategic Interaction and Networks
Bramoullé, Y., Kranton, R., & D'Amours, M. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.3.898 · Cited by 467
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Self-citationA Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency
Jackson, M. O. (2003) · CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) · doi:10.7907/c4y9t-bg336 · Cited by 374
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Structural holes in social networks
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Self-citationJackson, M. O., & Zenou, Y. (2015) · Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-53766-9.00003-3 · Cited by 313
Metadata
- Authors
- Goyal, S., & Moraga-Gonzalez, J. L.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2001
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 686
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2096773542
- Cited by
- 360
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 17.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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