The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States
Abstract
A matching problem is considered in which sellers can publicly commit to a trading price that differs from the price at which buyers expect to trade elsewhere in the market. When demand and supply are nearly equal, the equilibrium ex ante price offer lies below the price associated with the Nash bargaining split. This relationship reverses when the level of excess demand is large. Sellers always have an incentive to make ex ante offers when prices elsewhere are determined by Nash bargaining. This can be interpreted to mean that Nash bargaining is an unstable pricing institution. Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.
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Cites
On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
Hosios, A. J. (1990) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297382 · Cited by 1,547
Rubinstein, A., & Osborne, M. J. (1990) · Cited by 1,270
Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and Related Games
Mortensen, D. T. (1982) · American Economic Review · Cited by 534
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Shimer, R. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828053828572 · Cited by 2,731
Micro-Foundations of Urban Agglomeration Economies
Duranton, G., & Puga, D. (2003) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w9931 · Cited by 1,663
Chapter 48 Micro-foundations of urban agglomeration economies
Duranton, G., & Puga, D. (2004) · Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/s1574-0080(04)80005-1 · Cited by 1,374
Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market: A Survey
Rogerson, R., Shimer, R., & Wright, R. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205105775362014 · Cited by 1,051
Research, Patenting, and Technological Change
Kortum, S. S. (1997) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171741 · Cited by 916
Metadata
- Authors
- Peters, M.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1991-09
- Volume
- 59
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1425
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2008121102
- Cited by
- 262
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 4.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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