Wan, Xi, Shao: How China Meets Its Population Problem

Abstract

slogan wan, xi, shao (later, longer, fewer) is ubiquitous in People's Republic of China, reflecting fact that since early 1970s, government of world's most populous nation has intensified its efforts to reduce fertility. Every couple is exhorted to marry late, to space their births at long intervals and to have few children. Demographically, these three standards of reproductive practice are cornerstones of Chinese solution to problem of rapid population growth. Ideologically, these norms or exhortations have been incorporated into a recently articulated theory which states that as of material goods and services must be in a socialist economy, so also must anarchy of reproduction be ended. In interests of societal development and national prosperity, childbearing in every household must be placed tracks of nation's unified plan, so as to realize population growth. * In order to make wan, xi, shao operative, plan to solve China's population problem draws on specific strategies mentioned in New Population Theory developed by economist Ma Yinchu, who had advocated control of population growth as early as 1957. However, for than 20 years, until 1979, both Ma Yinchu and his population theory remained in disfavor with Chinese authorities. essence of Ma Yinchu's theory was that the State should have power to intervene in reproduction and to control population.' His recommendations included use of widespread propaganda to make people sensitive to harmful effects of early marriage and to importance of fertility limitation in context of economic development. He also urged that people should be educated to use methods of birth limitation and, important, that more stern and effective administrative measures be adopted to supplement these approaches if population growth was not effectively curbed.2 On March 5, 1978, Fifth National People's Congress formally made fertility limitation a matter of national concern when it adopted Article 53 of Constitution, which reads, The state advocates and encourages Even before this formal endorsement, however, reports of declines in Chinese birthrate were being increasingly noted. In cities and provinces as diverse as Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Sichuan, Hebei, Liaoning, Shandong, Jiangsu and Hubei, it was reported that rate of natural population increase had declined steadily in recent years, and by 1978 was below one percent a year.3 According to Chen Muhua, Vice Premier and Head of Planned Reproduction Group of State Council of Central Government, China's overall rate of natural increase had fallen to 12.1 per 1,000 in 1978 from 23.4 in 1971, and birthrate had dropped to 18.3 per 1,000 in 1978 from previous high of4O.0 per 1,000 in 1960s.4 Evidently, therefore, resumption and intensification of birth control activities undertaken by government programs have succeeded, in a very short time span, in lowering fertility in China. Even amid successes, however, thrust of recent government pronouncements on population issues has been to advocate still further decreases. official target is to reduce rate of natural increase to five per 1,000 by 1985, that is, to depress birthrate to about 11 per 1,000 in five to six years. China's determined efforts to solve its problem of rapid population growth or, in Chinese terms, to achieve planned population production can be seen in all aspects of Chinese life. Information about Chinese policy and its implementation is widely disseminated. But up to present, little was known of specific ways in which hundreds of millions of couples in China regulate their childbearing. Nor has it been totally clear by what specific means they have been able to keep reproduction within limits established by national population plan. Official accounts, as well as reports of numerous visitors to China, have been deficient in precise information about how lives of couples have been affected by their involvement in China's attempt to solve its population problem. Consequently, except in policy and organizational terms, country's recent successes in achieving fertility reduction have been difficult, if not impossible, to understand and explain. Similarly, observers still lack a strong factual basis upon which to assess whether further reductions are likely to be reached on schedule. purpose of this article, therefore, is to attempt to provide an account of ways in which Chinese women and men are responding to national effort to achieve reproduction. Such an account should also provide some overall indication of extent to,which China is likely to realize its objective of achieving an annual rate of natural increase of five per 1,000 by year 1985.