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What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary? Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action
Abstract
Peasant upheavals are studied from the perspective offered by the selective incentives solution to Olson's collective action problem. This article presents much evidence from three different forms of peasant struggles—everyday forms of peasant resistance, unorganized rural movements, and organized peasant rebellions—that demonstrates the widespread existence of selective incentives. Questions about the causes and consequences of selective incentives are then examined. First, what are the conditions under which peasant struggles emphasize material selective incentives rather than nonmaterial altruistic appeals? The level of selective incentives in any peasant upheaval is a function of demand and supply considerations. Peasants demand selective incentives. The suppliers include one or more dissident peasant organizations, the authorities, and the allies of both. A political struggle ensues as the suppliers compete and attempt to monopolize the market. Second, what are the conditions under which the pursuit of material self-interest hurts rather than helps the peasantry's collective cause? Selective incentives supplemented by ideology can be effective; selective incentives alone are counterproductive. These questions and answers lead to the conclusion that the selective incentives solution reveals much more about peasant upheavals than simply that peasants will often be concerned with their own material self-interest. It is therefore important to study the following three aspects of peasant collective action: the dilemma peasants face, or how peasant resistance is in the interest of all peasants but in the self-interest of none; the paradox peasants face, or that rational peasants do solve their dilemma (for example, with selective incentives) and participate in collective action; and the irony peasants face, or that self-interest is both at the root of their dilemma and at the foundation of a solution to their paradox.
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Cites
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China
Skocpol, T. (1979) · Cambridge University Press · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511815805 · Cited by 5,408
Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World
Goodwin, J., & Skocpol, T. (1989) · Politics & Society · doi:10.1177/003232928901700403 · Cited by 259
Cited by
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HUMPHREYS, M., & WEINSTEIN, J. M. (2006) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055406062289 · Cited by 563
Collective Action in the Formation of Pre-Modern States
Blanton, R., & Fargher, L. (2008) · Fundamental Issues in Archaeology · doi:10.1007/978-0-387-73877-2 · Cited by 499
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Weinstein, J. M. (2005) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002705277802 · Cited by 438
Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars
Regan, P. M., & Norton, D. (2005) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002704273441 · Cited by 431
Metadata
- Authors
- Lichbach, M. I.
- Venue
- World Politics
- Publisher
- Project MUSE
- Published
- 1994-04
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 383-418
- ISSN
- 0043-8871 (ISSN-L)
- 1086-3338
- OpenAlex
- W2052183344
- Cited by
- 164
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 9.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Lichbach, M. I. (1994). What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary? Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action. World Politics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2950687
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